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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of an attack by a Boise Police Department (BPD) canine on the 
Plaintiff, Melene James, which occurred on December 26, 2010. Plaintiff seeks to recover 
damages for severe and permanent injuries based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) in 
addition to certain state common law claims. The Plaintiffs Complaint names the City of 
Boise, and Boise Police Department Officers Steven Bonas, Steven Butler, Tim Kukla, Rodney 
Likes. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs complaint was filed on October 4, 2012. R. 6. Answers for all Defendants were 
filed by the Boise City Attorney's Office on November 29, 2012. R. 22. Thereafter, all parties 
engaged in discovery, disclosed experts, and on January 7, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment which was briefed by all parties and argued on February 19, 2014. The trial 
court entered its Memorandum Opinion and a separate Judgment on March 4, 2014. R. 732, 781. 
Plaintiff's filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 18, 2014. R. 783. Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed on April 15, 2014. R. 814. The Motion for Reconsideration was argued on April 21, 
2014 and denied on the record. The district court did not enter a written opinion but relied on its 
oral comments at the hearing. An order was entered on May 6, 2014 indicating that the 
additional facts presented would not change any aspect of the district court's opinion. R. 819. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. James was a denturist who operated under the name Renaissance Dental Lab. She 
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worked with Gene Vail, also a denturist. Mr. Vail leased dental lab space in the basement of the 
Northview Dental office which is located on the corner of Cole and Northview in Boise, Idaho. 
R. 701, 390, 391. The two story building was owned by dentists Carrick Brewster and his 
partner, Scott Hayhurst. R. 555. Mr. Vail is disabled and confined to a wheel chair. He had an 
arrangement with Ms. James where she was allowed to use the dental lab to operate her business, 
and in exchange, Ms. James would help Mr. Vail with his business, including pick up or delivery 
of his dental appliances. R. 701, 390, 391. 
On December 26, 2010, a Sunday, Ms. James was at home cooking a holiday meal for 
her family. She lived approximately a block from the dental office. She received a call from a 
friend who needed some emergency work done on a denture. Ms. James agreed and after 
receiving the denture, she went to the dental lab and entered through a locked basement level 
door utilizing her key. She went into the lab, turned on the light, started the compressor, vacuum 
and water switches. She then put water in a pressure pot and placed it on a burner. She then 
went to work on the denture, grinding acrylic around a missing tooth. She then repaired the area 
with the missing tooth, using what she described as a monomer polymer technique using powder 
and liquid to hold the new tooth. She then put the denture in the pressure pot and aired it to 25 
pounds. R. 701, 394, 395. 
Because the denture had to "cure," a process which takes about 25 minutes, she went 
outside to have a cigarette. When she was ready to return to the lab, she realized that she had left 
her purse, with her keys and her phone, inside. She was locked out. Several options went 
through her mind. She thought about going home and calling Mr. Vail but that meant leaving the 
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lab and her equipment running which was a potential fire hazard, particularly given the pressure 
pot which was still sitting on the burner. She knew that one of the windows to the lab was 
usually kept unlocked because it was often opened to air out the lab, as the chemical use caused 
strong odors. Because Mr. Vail was disabled, making it hard for him to open the window if it 
was latched, he had instructed Ms. James to leave the window shut, but not latched, so that he 
could open the window if she was not there. R. 701, 702, 395-397. 
Ms. James thought that it would save everyone "a lot of headache" if she just re-entered 
the building through the window, if it was open. Ms. James walked around to the northeast 
corner of the building and jumped down into the window well. As she was trying to slide the 
window open, her hands slipped and her elbow struck the single pane glass and it broke. 1 Ms. 
James had no intent to break the window to gain entry. R. 702, 396-397 
She recalls being cold and upset that she had broken the window. She still needed to get 
inside, however, and she started to climb in. She heard someone behind her ask if she needed 
any help. That person was Jared Hendryx. Mr. Hendryx had just pulled into the parking lot with 
his sons and they were going to his grandfather's house for a holiday dinner. His grandfather 
lived directly across the street from the dental office. Mr. Hendryx heard the glass break and 
walked over to the window well to see what was happening. He saw Ms. James climbing 
through the window and asked if she needed help. Ms. James responded that she had locked her 
keys inside. R. 702,397, 801,802,410. 
Mr. Hendryx believed Ms. James' actions to be peculiar and she seemed intoxicated or 
1 The window had a pre-existing crack similar to the glass in the adjacent window. R. 397. 
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under the influence of something. He called the police and reported what he had seen to 911. In 
his report to the dispatch, he advised that he had heard glass breaking and observed a woman 
entering the dental office through a basement window. Importantly, he also advised dispatch that 
the woman had appeared lethargic, possibly on narcotics and she stated that she needed to get her 
keys. R. 410, 801. 
When Ms. James was back in the lab, she was worried that Mr. Vail would be upset about 
the broken window. She was not sure what to do. She opened the small refrigerator in the lab to 
get some water and noticed beer in the fridge as well. She grabbed a can of beer and then 
decided she would complete the denture and then call Mr. Vail. So, she went back to work. She 
still had to take the denture out of the pressure pot, grind the rough acrylic off with a roto tool, 
then polish the denture on a lathe. After that work was complete, she placed the denture in a bag 
and went to the bathroom before calling Mr. Vail. That is her last memory before being attacked 
by the police canine. R 703, 704, 397-399. 
Mr. Hendryx's call to 911 was logged at 5:22 p.m. Officer Butler was the first officer on 
scene and he made contact with Mr. Hendryx. Dispatch logged his arrival at 5:30 p.m. R. 410, 
411. Mr. Hendryx testified that he flagged down the first officer who arrived and they walked 
to window well where Ms. James had been seen entering and that he stood there with the officer 
for 10- 15 seconds. They could see Ms. James. R. 801, 802. 
Significant inconsistencies exist between Officer Butler's official report and Mr. 
Hendryx's recollection. Officer Butler prepared a narrative report which states, pertinently: 
I spoke with a male who was waiting on the north side of 
Northview near the dental office which was reportedly being 
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burglarized. He told me he had seen a female break the window 
and enter the business and said he believed the suspect was still 
inside the downstairs area of the business. 
I walked to the north east comer of the building, saw that a north 
facing window had been broken out, and a short time later saw a 
female standing near the broken window holding a Steele Reserve 
Malt liquor can in her left hand and manipulating several sharp 
dental instruments including a knife in her right hand. I relayed 
what I had seen to other officers who were on scene or on their 
way to the location. R. 414. 
Officer Butler does not identify the fact that the witness, Mr. Hendryx, was at the window well 
with him and he wTites that Mr. Hendryx told him that he had seen Ms. James break the window 
and enter the building. He omits any information about Ms. James' statement that she was 
locked out and entering to get her keys. Officer Butler is the only BPD Officer who testified he 
saw Ms. James and he also testified that he only saw Ms. James on one occasion and his 
observations were brief, seconds, not minutes. R. 704, 426, 430. 
Even though some 8-10 minutes had passed between Mr. Hendryx's initial observation 
of Ms. James, his subsequent 911 call, and the arrival of Officer Butler, Ms. James was still in 
the lit room in the basement where she had entered when Officer Butler arrived. Mr. Hendryx 
testified that he and Officer Butler could see Ms. James standing in the room, drinking a beer. 
Mr. Hendryx stated she was "not really doing anything." She wasn't ruffling through drawers or 
any of that kind of stuff. Mr. Hendryx did not see Ms. James holding anything in her in her hand 
that appeared to be a weapon, such as a knife. some point, another officer arrived and began 
talking with Officer Butler. At that point, Mr. Hendryx backed away. He stayed in the parking 
lot area for a couple of minutes and then went back to his grandfather's house. R. 802, 803. 
9 
Even though officer Butler writes that Mr. Hendryx told him he had seen Ms. James 
break the window, Mr. Hendryx denied saying that because he did not see the window get 
broken. He also recalls specifically telling the officer that Ms. James had stated to him that she 
had locked her keys inside and he told Officer Butler Ms. James was the only person that he had 
seen. R. 801, 802. 
Officer Butler described his position when observing Ms. James as some 6-8 feet away 
from the window. He was outside, on ground level. Ms. James was in the basement, inside the 
building, in the lit dental lab and clearly had no means to get to Officer Butler's position. When 
asked why he did not just call out to her and find out what she was doing, Officer Butler testified 
that he felt personally threatened by Ms. James and he never attempted to talk with her and find 
out why she there. R. 430, 431. 
Numerous BPD units started to arrive on scene. At 5:40 p.m., or within 10 minutes or so 
of arrival, officers requested a "bite" dog. Dispatch advised that no bite dog was available at that 
time. R. 410. A decision was made to secure the perimeter of the building and wait until bite 
dog was available. R. 705, 475. Because the building was secure, BPD officers conceded that 
there was no "urgency." R. 705, 466, 482, 545. 
BPD policy states that if a suspect is in a building and use of a canme is being 
considered, attempts to contact the building owner should be made to determine if there are 
tenants and ascertain the building layouts. The on scene commander is directed to evacuate all 
tenants, workers or others in the building prior to deployment of the canine. R. 349, 350. 
Officer Barber made contact with Carrick Brewster. Dr. Brewster indicated that he 
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would have an assistant who lived nearby drop off a key and he also came to the scene. A 
person identified as a cleaning lady also arrived. Officer Barber talked with the cleaning lady 
and Dr. Brewster. Officer Barber learned that there were tenant relationships unaffiliated with 
the dental practice, including a dental lab in the basement. The cleaning lady indicated that other 
people, including a female, worked in the basement (i.e. the dental lab). However, when the 
cleaning lady started to describe the female who worked in the basement, the conversation was 
cut off because Dr. Brewster stated that no one had the right to be in the building if they had to 
break a window to get in. Officer Barber omitted this information from his report and there is no 
evidence that any of the officers attempted to follow up on the cleaning lady's statement that the 
female in the building may have been someone who worked there. R. 575, 458, 459, 555, 556. 
The K-9 officer, Steven Bonas, was logged on scene at 6:10 p.m. R. 411. Deployment of 
a police canine for the location and apprehension of a suspect is specifically defined as use of 
force. The canine officer is required to assess the "totality of the circumstances" before deciding 
whether to use force by deploying a canine. A decision to use a canine is then reviewed by the 
commanding officer on the scene who can agree or overrule the canine officer. R. 588. Lt. 
Douglas Schoenborn was the commanding officer on scene. 
vVhen Officer Bonas arrived he was briefed by Sgt. Kukla, Officer Butler, and Officer 
Barber. R. 593. Sgt. Kukla provided the follow testimony regarding what information was 
shared with Officer Bonas, and subsequently, Lt. Schoenborn: 
Q. [w]hen you were having your initial discussions with Officer 
Bonas and -- well, not you having the discussions -- but when 
you were with Officer Bonas and Officer Butler and the 
information was being provided to Bonas about the situation, do 
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you recall whether Officer Butler told Officer Bonas that in his 
observations of the suspect, he observed her manipulating dental 
instruments? 
A. He advised that the suspect had picked up some kind of edged 
weapon -- whatever that might be -- some kind of edged 
instrument. 
Q. Okay. And do you remember him saying anything other than -
- I think you used the term "armed herself'? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But did anybody tell Bonas that she had been seen -- what 
Butler describes as "manipulating dental instruments" -- in addition 
to having a knife in her hand? 
A. I believe all that was made clear. 
Q. To Bonas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Was it also made clear to Bonas that the location where 
she was seen was a dental lab? 
A. I don't recall specifically. I mean, we all knew it was a dental 
office, and the downstairs was associated with that office. 
Q. I understand that. 
A. I don't know. You'd have to ask them. 
Q. Well, but I'm just asking your recollection as to whether in this 
conversation that you're having with Officer Bonas whether you or 
Officer Butler -- well, I'll just ask you: Do you recall telling 
Officer Bonas that the place where she was seen was a dental lab? 
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A. I don't recall saying that. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not Butler did? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. Did you tell Officer Bonas that the person who was 
believed to be inside the building had told the calling party that she 
was going in to get her keys? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know if Officer Butler did? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. So you don't know if he had that information when was 
making his decision to deploy the dog? 
A. No. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. Did you tell Officer Bonas that there was a person on-
site who believed that the person in the building may have actually 
worked in the building? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Officer Butler share that information? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Do you know if Officer Barber did? 
A. I don't know what information was shared between Barber and 
Bonas. 
Q. Okay. When you talked to Lieutenant Schoenborn and advised 
him of the plan, did you tell him that the person in the building had 
told the calling party that she was going in to get her keys? 
A. I don't remember. 
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R. 485,486. 
Q. Did you tell him that the location where she was seen was a 
dental lab? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't remember saying that to him? 
A. I don't remember the specifics of that conversation. 
Q. Okay. Did you tell him, if you remember -- well, I'll just short-
circuit this: Do you remember anything specifically that you told 
Lieutenant Schoenborn? 
A. I told him the basics of what I knew of the facts at the time, 
which is what I already said: The forced entry, seen with the knife, 
disappearing in the darkness of the building, and still inside. 
Q. Okay. And, you know, I apologize if it sounds like I'm 
"beating a dead horse," but I'm trying to create my record, as well. 
A. Yeah, I know -- and the fact that nobody was supposed to be in 
there per the owner of the building. 
Q. Right. But do you have an independent recollection one way 
or the other of telling Lieutenant Schoenborn that the location that 
she was seen was a dental lab? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Do you have an independent recollection of telling him that she 
was seen manipulating dental instruments? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Did you tell him or do you recall telling him that there 
was somebody on-scene that thought the person in the building 
may actually be someone that worked in the building? 
A. No. 
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Officer Bonas testified, and wrote in his report, that he was told that a witness called 911 
after seeing Ms. James "force entry into the dental lab by shattering a downstairs window." He 
was also told that Ms. James was "armed" with a knife and that the building owner said no one 
should be inside. The statement that Ms. James was seen "shattering a window" is false. In 
addition, Officer Bonas denies learning that Ms. James had told the witness she had locked 
herself out and needed to get her keys. He denies learning that she was seen by the witness 
entering a lit room and was still in that location when officers arrived later. He denies learning 
that the location was a dental lab and that suspect was seen manipulating dental instruments, 
drinking a beer. He denies being told that a cleaning lady was on site and had advised the 
officers that a female worked in the dental lab of the building and that she could provide a 
description. R. 507,508,363,364. 
Lt. Schoenborn, the commander on scene, was subsequently debriefed by Sgt. Kukla. He 
did not override the decision to use the canine and testified as follows: 
Q. Do you recall gathering or gaining information that the person 
that was in the building may have had a reason to be there? 
A. No. 
Q. So you don't recall ever being advised that the person inside the 
building may have worked there? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you ever recall being advised that the person inside the 
building had told somebody that they were entering because they 




Q. Were you ever advised that the person inside the building may 
have worked in the dental lab? 
A. No. 
Q. Would that have been helpful information to you in deciding 
whether or not to make entry or how to make entry? 
A. Well, if you are asking me to speculate on non-facts, I could. 
Despite the conceded lack of urgency, Officer Bonas made the decision to utilize the dog 
quickly. The Incident History report reflects that Officer Bonas reported on scene at 6: 10:27 
p.m. Some seven minutes later, or 6:17:55 p.m., the report reflects that a decision to make entry 
with a K-9 had been made. At 6:19:01 p.m., or one minute and 23 seconds later, dispatch reports 
that "the dogs away." Officer Bonas agreed that the decision to use the dog was made within the 
roughly 7 minute time frame reflected by the Incident History. That would necessarily include 
the time it took to separately debrief Lt. Schoenborn as well, after Officer Bonas met with 
Officers Butler, Barber and Kukla. R. 410,411. 
BPD Policy requires that before a canine 1s deployed, warnings be issued and an 
opportunity be given to allow the person to surrender. The only "canine warning" reflected in 
the written police reports of the involved officers were those given by Officer Bonas just prior to 
the initial entry and then two additional warnings while inside the building. R. 589, 363-365, 
414, 555, 556. 
During depositions, however, several officers testified that canine warnings were initially 
given over the PA from a patrol car before entry was made. Numerous inconsistencies about the 
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alleged PA announcements exist, however. First, Officer Butler testified that he was ordered by 
Sgt. Kukla to give a PA canine warning and that he so did so, from his patrol car, at least 10 
minutes, and maybe 20 minutes, before entry was made. R. 432, 433. Officer Barber, however, 
testified that he specifically moved his patrol car close to the building for purposes of giving the 
PA announcement which was made from his car, not Officer Butler's. R. 432,433. 
Jared Hendryx, who had returned to his grandfather's house across the street, testified 
that he never heard any PA announcements or canine warnings. He qualified his answer by 
stating his grandfather had installed expensive windows to decrease sound but he conceded that 
he could hear sirens from emergency vehicles on Cole Road. R. 803. 
Regardless, according to Officer Butler, a canine warning was given over the PA before 
Officer Bonas was even on the scene and before the decision to use a canine had been made. R. 
432,433. If true, that would violate policy and is contrary to standard protocol as Officer Bonas 
testified that warnings are not given until the dog is actually out of the car because if a suspect 
fled after the warning, the dog is useless if still in the car. R. 516. 
Sgt. Kukla testified about the PA announcements as follows: 
Q. Okay. And so once the decision has been made to deploy the 
dog and the Entry T earn is picked, then what happens next? When 
you say, "We execute our plan," I understand -- I really want to 
know physically what you guys do. 
A. Make an announcement on the radio that we're going to deploy 
the dog and make entry into the building, at which point the Entry 
Team moves up to the front of the building -- which in this case is 
on the east side facing the parking lot. They use the keys that they 
had - that Officer Barber had gotten to unlock the door. They 
open the door -- actually, I'll take that back. Prior to doing all 
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that, we made announcements from the PA in that vehicle that was 
parked at the northeast corner where we were standing 
announcing that there was going to be a canine deployment into 
the building, and that any suspect inside should come forward at 
that time to surrender. After making I want to say at least two of 
those announcements and confirming that they were heard by 
the officers on the other side, then we entered into up to the -- or 
walked up to the front of the building, opened the door, at which 
point Bonas then made a verbal announcement into the building. 
After making his announcement and having no response, the Entry 
T earn went in and started cleaning the top floor of the building. I 
came in behind them -- again just kind of watching their back side 
and being in a supervisory position. As they made their way 
through the building from east to west, I believe that Officer 
Bonas stopped somewhere midway and made another 
announcement, a canine announcement, and we finished clearing 
the top of the building. 
***** 
Q. \Vhen you made the PA announcement, who --well, strike that. 
Who made the decision to make the announcement over the PA? 
A. Oftentimes, that's protocol based on the situation. In this case 
we were making entry into the building. You know, it's a fairly 
small building. We make those announcements routinely prior to 
entry. 
Q. So from that, I gather, that it was just standard protocol and 
nobody made a specific order to anybody to make sure you do a 
PA announcement? 
A. I remember Bonas bringing that up in his discussion with 
Butler that he wanted to make a PA announcement. 
***** 
Q. Okay. And how soon after the PA announcement did you 
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actually go in the building? How much time transpired? 
A. I couldn't put a minute time on it, but I know it was not a 
rushed entry into the building. We gave sufficient time for 
somebody to respond. 
Q. Okay. Is there a protocol for how long you wait? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So do you have any sense at all as to whether it was two 
minutes, five minutes, 15 minutes, 20 minutes? 
A. It wasn't beyond five to ten minutes. It was within five to ten 
minutes that we made entry. 
R. 483,484 (emphasis added). 
As noted, from the time that decision to use the dog was reported over dispatch, one 
minute and 23 seconds elapsed before it was reported that the "dog was away". Officer Bonas 
testified that the PA announcement was made after the decision was made to deploy the dog and 
the dog was out of the car. Thus, contrary to the detailed sequences and passage of time 
suggested by Sgt. Kukla, and the testimony of Officer Butler that a PA warning was given 10, 
maybe 20 minutes before entry, the documented record shows that the officers allowed for one 
minute and 23 seconds to give "at least" two PA announcements; confirm they were heard by all 
officers; walk to the front of the building; give a third PA announcement at the front door; and 
then make entry. 
BPD K-9 policy relative to a person search is "Handler Controlled" which means that the 
canine could bark and hold or bark and bite depending on the command of the handler. R. 573. 
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However, Officer Bonas testified that the canines are trained, once off leash and searching, to 
bite the first person that they come into contact with. In other words, no command is necessary. 
So, for example, if the cleaning lady who was on site on the night of the incident had actually 
been in the office cleaning, instead of talking to the officers, and the canine found her first, she 
would have been bitten. R. 510, 511. 
Officer Bonas and the entry team entered the building and searched the upstairs of the 
dental office. There was no indication that anything was missing or that it had been burglarized. 
The team then went to the top of the stairs leading to the basement where another announcement 
was made and the K-9 was then commanded to the basement. At that point, he was out of sight 
and on a different level of the building from his handler. R. 593, 594. 
BPD policy states that a canine warning shall be issued on each level of a multistory 
building. If tactical considerations do not allow for a warning, policy requires that the failure to 
give a warning, and the reason why, be specifically documented in writing in the deployment or 
other administrative report. R. 350. 
Audio of the incident reflects that within 2 seconds of being released to the basement, the 
canine went into "bark alert" which signaled to Officer Bonas that he smelled somebody but had 
not found them. Officer Bonas did not know where the dog was. Officer Bonas gave a bite 
command to encourage him to locate the source of the odor and apprehend the suspect. Seconds 
later, Officer Bonas could hear screaming. The team descended into the basement and found that 
the dog was iriside a bathroom with Ms. James who was still screaming. Officer Bonas stated 
that initially the door was open a few inches and then it closed with the dog inside the enclosed 
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room with Ms. James. R. 517-520. 
Officer Bonas gave commands to Ms. James, asking if she was armed, while other 
officers attempted to get the door open. When the door was finally opened, Officer Bonas could 
see the dog biting Ms. James on the arm. He commanded Ms. James to show her hands but, 
according to Officer Bonas, she "refused" those commands. Eventually, he gave several 
commands for the dog to stop biting and lay down which he did. R. 517-520. 
Ms. James was found lying on the ground with her pants, and panties, pulled down below 
her waist. Ms. James was pulled off the floor, handcuffed, searched and taken to an ambulance 
and then the hospital. R. 648,464,487, 520. 
The officers continued to clear the basement. They did not find any additional persons. 
They found no evidence of any burglary. Officer Nielsen was dispatched to the scene with 
instructions to photograph and otherwise inventory the scene. Officer Butler was shown the 
photographs and could not identify anything that looked like the knife he believed Ms. James 
was holding. R. 440, 441. There is no evidence that a knife was found at the scene. 
At the emergency room, Ms. James was worked up for her injuries. Her BAC level was 
.27. Ms. James admitted in her deposition that she was drinking while cooking dinner that 
afternoon for her family and she also had the beer at the dental lab. Officer Barber also spoke 
with Ms. James' daughter at the emergency room and was informed that her mother worked in 
the dental lab and that she had gone to the dental lab that evening to work on a denture for a 
friend. R. 556. 
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III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the district court misapplied the standard of review and otherwise erred in 
granting summary judgment and dismissing all of Plaintiffs claims as a matter of law. 
A. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The District Court Determined that the Operative Facts Were Undisputed 
and Therefore Failed to Review the Record in a Light most Favorable to the 
Plaintiff. 
Summary judgment is warranted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). A "strong line" of authority sets the standard under which this Court 
reviews a motion for summary judgment. Harris v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 
295,298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). 
The reviewing court must liberally construe disputed facts in favor of the 
nonmoving party and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. If the record contains any conflicting inferences upon which 
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be 
denied. Nevertheless, when a party moves for summary judgment, the opposing 
party's case must not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence 
is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. 
The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the 
moving party. This burden is onerous because even "circumstantial" evidence can 
create a genuine issue of material fact. However, the Court will consider only that 
material contained in affidavits or depositions which is based upon personal 
knowledge and which would be admissible at trial. Summary judgment is 
properly issued when the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case. 
Id. ( emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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In excessive force cases, summary judgment should be sparingly granted, "[b ]ecause [the 
excessive force] inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions 
and to draw inferences ... " See Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002); see also, 
Liston v. County of Roverside, 120 F.3d 965,976 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1997); see also, Sprague v. City 
of Burley, 109 Idaho 656, 668, 710 P.2d 566, 578 (1985); see also, Kessler v. Barowsky, 129 
Idaho 647, 657, 931 P.2d 641, 651 (1997). Summary judgment is only appropriate when the 
Court "concludes, after resolvirnz all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, that the officer's 
use of force was objectively reasonable under all circumstances." ( emphasis added). See, Scott v. 
Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994); see also, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 
(1986); see also, Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1992). 
The district court acknowledged the standard of review required that it review the factual 
record, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. That 
necessarily included resolving factual disputes in plaintiffs favor. However, the district court 
then incorrectly found that all of the operative facts in this case were undisputed and this limited 
its inquiry to whether "the only reasonable conclusion is that the use of force was objectively 
reasonable." R. 745. As the following will show, there are numerous disputed facts, starting 
with whether a reasonably objective police officer would have concluded that a burglary was 
actually taking place and whether any force was necessary at all to detain the suspect in the 
building. 
B. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Level of Intrusion on Ms. 
James' Constitutional Rights Was Not Severe. 
In the face of a claim that police officers have inflicted unconstitutional harm upon 
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another, courts look at the gravity of the particular intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests by 
evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted. See, Miller v. Clark County, 340 F3d 959, 964 
(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994)). The more significant 
the intrusion, the more difficult it is to justify use of force. In this case, the district court made a 
determination that the injuries suffered by Ms. James were more than minimal, but not severe, 
choosing instead to characterize the intrusion as "something greater than moderate but less than 
severe." R. 746. 
The evidence in the record, including photos, summarized the injuries to Ms. James as 
reflected in her medical records: 
The ER doctor stated that the number of bites were too "innumerable" to count. 
Ms. James had puncture wounds and bite marks on her face ( cheek and jaw), up 
and down her right arm, and her left hand. She suffered lacerations to her jaw, 
abrasions to her left hip, a right ulnar fracture ( oblique distal fracture and chip off 
mid shaft radius), right elbow and wrist subluxation, aspiration pneumonia, a left 
Ll transverse process fracture, and she had blood in her right ear. 
Her bites became infected which necessitated that she take an antibiotic that was 
specific to dog bite wounds but to which she was allergic. Despite that allergy, 
she had to take the antibiotic or run the risk of her complete arm becoming 
infected and potentially losing her arm. The antibiotic made her very ill over the 
course of the next several months. 
Subsequent medical workup revealed a fracture to her spine, a suspected nerve 
injury, PTSD, and increased anxiety disorder. Ms. James suffered nerve damage 
in her right arm and she has not regained full use of that arm even today, which 
has impacted her ability to make dentures and continue her work. Emotionally, 
she still suffers from anxiety and has been diagnosed with PTSD. 
R. 659, 601-621. 
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In rejecting Ms. James' argument that the injuries were severe, the district court relied on 
the Miller case, supra. However, in Afiller, the court initially was assessing whether or not the 
use of the canine, in that case, was deadly force. It noted, generally, ordering a police dog to bite 
a suspect does not pose more than a remote possibility of death in most circumstances. The 
Court went on to find that ordering a police dog to bite a suspect's arm or leg, and permitting the 
dog to continue biting for up to one minute, an unusually long bite duration, does not pose more 
than a remote possibility of death and therefore it was not considered deadly force. However, 
the Afiller court, based on evidence that the dog was trained to only bite and hold a suspects arm 
or leg, and that the bite lasted for 45 to 60 seconds, when ordinarily the bite lasts no longer than 
four seconds, also found that the intrusion was "serious." Miller, 340 F.3d at 961, 964. 
Here, the canine that attacked Ms. James was not limited by training to only bite arms or 
legs and had discretion to bite anywhere, including a suspects face or neck. In fact, the canine 
did bite Ms. James' face multiple times. She suffered innumerable puncture wounds in an 
encounter lasting at least 36 seconds which, as in Miller, was much longer than a bite that lasted 
ordinarily four seconds. Ms. James' injuries are more consistent with a mauling than a simple 
bite and hold. In combination with her physical and emotional injuries, a jury could easily find 
the nature and quality of intrusion was severe, and again, the court is required to view the factual 
record in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. 
C. Graham v. Connor Requires the Court to Review the Record in a Light Most 
Favorable to the Plaintiff before Applving Various Factors. 
The legal standards governing excessive force cases are set forth in Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Excessive force claims against law enforcement officers are analyzed 
25 
under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. This standard requires the "nature and 
quality of the intrusion" on a person's liberty to be balanced against the "countervailing 
governmental interests at stake." Id at 396. The balancing act contemplates the totality of the 
circumstances existing at the time of the incident to determine if the officer's use of force was 
objectively reasonable. Id. at 397. Reasonableness in the use of force is evaluated "from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." 
Id. at 396. However, when faced with a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the 
facts in light most favorable to the non-moving party before it applies the Graham analysis. See, 
Scott v. Henrich; Graham v. Connor; Hopkins v. Andaya, supra. 
Factors relevant to the governmental interest are "[l] the severity of the crime at issue, 
[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and [3] 
whether [the suspect] is actively revisiting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Additional factors include: "[4] alternative levels of force, [5] 
warnings, [6] the existence of probable cause or [7] the conformity of the defendant officers' 
actions with department guidelines." Jones v. Kootenai County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4131, 
*32 (D. Idaho 2010); citing Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010). By 
erroneously concluding that the factual record was undisputed, the district court necessarily 
failed to consider how certain factual disputes, if viewed in Plaintiff's favor, would affect the 
analysis of these various factors. 
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D. The District Court Erred by Finding That the Officers Had No Reason to 
Question Whether a Burglary was Committed such that the Severity of 
Crime Factor Weighed Heavilv in Defendants Favor. 
In addressing the severity of the crime, the district court simply concluded that the 
officers reasonably believed that the Plaintiff was engaged in the felony crime of burglary which 
is a serious and potentially violent crime. The district court discounted, or refused to accept, any 
suggestion to the contrary. In fact, the district court characterized Plaintiff's arguments as 
impermissibly attacking whether the officers had probable cause to believe a "crime" had 
occurred, stating that the "undisputed facts confronting the police ... would lead any reasonable 
officer to conclude a burglary was taking place." R. 750. 
However, the Plaintiff pointed to numerous facts which should have caused a reasonable 
police officer to question whether a burglary was actually occurring, including the omissions of 
fact in the officers' reports. Ms. James supported that argument with the Affidavit of her expert, 
Dan Montgomery. Mr. Montgomery has 50 plus years oflaw enforcement experience, including 
25 years serving as a Chief of Police. He testified that numerous facts would have caused a 
reasonable police officer to question whether or not a burglary was actually occurring. 
Specifically, Mr. Montgomery noted that the suspect was seen entering the dental lab, she knew 
she had been seen, and see told the witness she had to go in to get her keys. Mr. Montgomery 
notes that while her actions where suspicious, they were also consistent with someone who had 
locked herself out of the building. Mr. Montgomery further notes that it is unusual for females to 
commit forced entry burglaries and it is rare for persons with the criminal intent to burglarize to 
continue the crime if they have been spotted and/or identified. R. 682. 
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Mr. Montgomery also noted that when Officer Butler arrived on the scene, some 8 
minutes after the 911 call was made, he made observations of the suspect, she was still in the 
same location she had been seen entering (a lit dental lab), she was observed holding a beer and 
manipulating dental instruments, including a knife. Mr. Montgomery testified that a reasonable 
police officer would ask themselves why the person was still in the same location where she was 
seen entering, knowing that they had been seen, and then take time to drink beer and use dental 
instruments, (in a dental lab) if, in fact, they were intent on committing a burglary. R. 682. 
Mr. Montgomery noted that BPD policy requires that if canines are used to search a 
building, officers are to inquire about tenants, workers or others in the building and to evacuate 
those persons. He notes that the officers learned from a cleaning lady that a female worked in 
the building and that she started to describe the person but was cut off because of the building 
owner's statement that no one should be there. When coupled with the other information known 
to the officers, specifically, that the person in the building was female; stated she needed to enter 
because to get her keys; was in a lit dental lab; and still in that lab well after the 911 call was 
made, even though she knew she had been seen entering, reasonable police officers would have 
questioned whether a burglary was really taking place and investigated further. Mr. 
Montgomery averred that it was completely unreasonable for the officers to not follow up on the 
information that the person in the basement may be someone who worked there. 
A reasonable police officer, according to Mr. Montgomery, and consistent with BPD 
policy regarding evacuation, would have allowed the cleaning lady to complete her description 
and then talked with Officer Butler, or the witness, to see if the description matched. The 
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officers should have talked with the owner to get names or phone numbers of people who 
worked in the building. Such steps likely would have led to the identification of Ms. James and 
officers would have discovered that she worked in the building and that she lived just a block 
away. R. 683-684. 
Mr. Montgomery noted that the officers had ample time to continue investigating and 
gather information as there was no stated urgency and the building perimeter was secure. 
However, the officers not only shut down the flow of information from the cleaning lady, for 
example, they escalated the situation by making entry within 10 minutes after Officer Bonas 
arrived with the canine. R. 684. 
Mr. Montgomery testified that while the cnme of burglary is serious, there were 
numerous factors which should have led a reasonable police officer to seriously question whether 
or not a burglary was in fact occurring. Mr. Montgomery testified, in his opinion, that a 
reasonable police officer would have accounted for those factors before moving forward. 
Based on the facts known to the officers, a11d given the opinions of Mr. Montgomery, a 
jury could fairly conclude that a burglary was not taking place or that the officers could and 
should have investigated further before choosing to use force and deploy a police dog. However, 
the district court ignored the premise of Plaintiffs argument and instead, characterized the 
argument as simply attacking the officers' probable cause. The district court's view ignores the 
fact that if Ms. James was suspected of nothing more than breaking a window, versus 
burglarizing a commercial building, the "severity of the crime" analysis is viewed in a 
significantly different light, as is the decision to use force. 
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Moreover, the law does not simply disregard probable cause as immaterial to the 
analysis, particularly when looking at the factors outlined by Graham, and even if the officers 
reasonably concluded that a burglary was ongoing, despite the evidence to the contrary, police 
should not be allowed, or encouraged, to operate under the assumption that all burglaries will 
end in a shoot-out or knife fight. Careful attention to the factual circumstances surrounding each 
event is required. 
The district court relied upon Reed v. Wallace, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175019, at *9 (D. 
Minn. 2013), to say that burglary is an inherently dangerous felony. R. 748. However, the court 
in Reed was referencing sentencing guidelines for the "burglary of a dwelling" as being a crime 
of violence. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9 (emphasis added). In Reed, the victim of the crime, a 
woman, called the police to report that two men had broken into her home. Id. at * 1-2. One of 
the burglars fled into the wooded area around the rural residence before a police dog twice bit 
and apprehended him. Id. at *2-6. It is beyond dispute that a burglary by two men into the home 
of a woman poses a significant threat and gives rise to an inherently dangerous situation. 
However, in this case, Ms. James was not suspected of burglarizing an occupied home 
late at night, but an empty dental office in the evening on a Sunday. Ms. James was by herself 
and described as being lethargic. The police observed her inside a lit basement, and she was 
standing around drinking a beer and manipulating dental instruments. While Officer Butler 
claims that she armed herself, given the testimony of Mr. Hendryx and the fact that no knife was 
ever found, a reasonable inference is that no knife existed. 
The district court also relied on Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep 't, 854 F.Supp. 
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2d 860, 874 (D. Nev. 2012), to point out that an officers use of force may be justified even 
though they were mistaken that a burglary was in progress. In Sandoval, the suspected 
burglaries were occurring in a residential area, and the most significant force used was when the 
officer shot a pit bull lunging at him. Id. at 869. The use of force against the human beings 
included handcuffing and having a gun pointed at them. Id. at 874. The court determined 
handcuffing and pointing a gun at the suspected burglars was an objectively reasonable use of 
force, even though the officers were wrong that a burglary was in progress. Id. 
Unlike the facts in Sandoval, Ms. James was not merely handcuffed, she had a police K-9 
bite her multiple times on her face and arms, behind a closed door while sitting on a toilet. Even 
if it was objectively reasonable for Defendant Officers to mistakenly believe Ms. James was a 
burglar, the use of force in this case far exceeds the use of force used in Sandoval and that case 
does not stand for the notion that any use of force is always permissible when an officer 
mistakenly believes a burglary is in progress. A more apt interpretation is that it stands for the 
notion that the use of appropriate force is permissible. What is appropriate depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each case. 
The district court also quotes from Frunz v. City of Tacoma, 468 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th 
Cir. 2006) to say: 
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that "when officers suspect a burglary in progress, they 
have no idea who might be inside and may reasonably assume that the suspects ·will, if 
confronted, flee or offer armed resistance. In such exigent circumstances, the police are 
entitled to enter immediately, using all appropriate force." R. 748. 
The district court's use of Frunz for the noted statement is completely out of context. In 
\ 
Frunz the Plaintiff had two guests at her home when police surrounded the house, broke down 
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the back door, and entered with guns at the ready. Guns were pointed at the "suspects" who were 
commanded, or forced, to the floor and then handcuffed and detained. Id. 468 F.3d at 1142. 
The underlying facts leading to the police presence included a 911 call from a neighbor 
who had been asked to keep an eye on the house by the plaintiffs ex-husband. The witness saw 
the plaintiff, the ex-wife, arrive at the house. Believing she was not supposed to be there, the 
neighbor called 911. Police went to the home, looked for signs of a break in and knocked on the 
door and got no answer. Officers called the witness and said they were leaving but said he 
should call back ifhe saw evidence that the house was occupied. Id. 468 F.3d at 1143. 
The witness did call back after he observed the ex-wife open the door for a visitor. He 
also advised officers the he believed the ex-wife was under a restraining order prohibiting her 
from being at the house. In reality, the ex-wife had been awarded the house as part of the 
divorce and she had been living there for the better part of a week. Id 
In upholding a jury verdict favorable to the Plaintiff, finding that the officers unlawfully 
entered the house and used excessive force, the Frunz Court was highly critical of the officers' 
stated belief that they reasonably believed a burglary to be occurring and that they needed to 
enter immediately. Id. 468 F.3d at 1144. 
The court noted that burglars do not typically open the door when someone knocks. 
More importantly, the statement emphasized by the district court here was used by the Frunz 
Court to show why the exigency of the situation as claimed by the officers did not, in fact, exist, 
rather than as some justification to support their otherwise unreasonable beliefs. Id. 468 F .3d at 
1145, 1146. 
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In Frunz, the Court found that there was much the officers could have done to further 
investigate the circumstances before bursting into the home unannounced. That included 
contacting the calling party and getting contact information about the owners of the home or 
simply knocking on the door of the house. Id 468 F.3d at 1146. 
The Frunz Court clearly did not avoid utilizing probable cause evidence in the excessive 
force analysis. Frunz also lends support for the reasonableness of Plaintiff's expert's affidavit 
who offered similar concerns about the officer's actions in this case. However, rather than accept 
the opinions of Mr. Montgomery, which were completely unopposed by the Defendants, the 
district court found that his testimony was "unduly favorable" and proceeded to substitute its 
own judgment for that of an otherwise qualified and unchallenged expert. 
For example, as to Mr. Montgomery's statement regarding female burglaries, the district 
court rejects his premise because he offered no statistics supporting his contention that females 
generally do not commit burglaries. The district court then stated that there is no justifiable 
reason to believe that women are not as capable as men in doing so, finding that women do 
commit burglaries and police cannot be expected to not act because of a suspect's gender. R. 
751. However, Mr. Montgomery did not say that females do not commit burglaries nor did he 
suggest that officers should refuse to act because of a suspects' gender. Rather, Mr. 
Montgomery's statement was that "females generally do not commit forced entry burglaries .... " 
While admittedly !vlr. Montgomery did not provide statistics, the defendants did not object to any 
aspect of his affidavit and the statement is plainly based on his 50 years of law enforcement 
expenence. 
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The district court also refused to accept the unopposed opinion of Mr. Montgomery that it 
is "rare [for] a person with the intent to burglarize [to] continue the crime if they have been 
spotted and/or identified." The district court instead found that "not all burglars immediately 
abandon their crime and take flight from the scene when spotted entering, particularly those 
whose thinking is significantly impaired by alcohol and/or drugs. It is apparent that James gives 
far too much credit to the collective intelligence and judgment of burglars." R. 752. Again, the 
district court, rather than view the facts favorably to the Plaintiff, simply rejects an otherwise 
admissible and foundationally sound opinion from a very well qualified expert and it does so 
without objection or complaint from the defense. Mr. Montgomery did not say "all" burglars 
abandon their crime. Rather, his point was that if a reasonable police officer is going evaluate 
the totality of circumstances, that necessarily includes taking into account certain facts that bear 
upon whether or not a crime actually is taking place. The Frunz decision would certainly 
support the view that reasonable police officers are expected, if not required, to do just that. 
The district court takes issue with Mr. Montgomery's reference to Ms. James' statement 
to the witness that she was entering the building to get her keys. Mr. Montgomery noted that her 
actions were suspicious but her statement could also be consistent with someone who had 
actually locked themselves out. Rather than acknowledge that a police officer would also have 
to consider both possible inferences when looking at the totality of circumstances, the district 
court accepted only one possible reference, stating that Ms. James' statement to Mr. Hendryx was 
"entirely consistent with someone committing a crime yet feigning legitimacy to minimize the 
witness's suspicion." The district court then concluded that a person who locks their keys in a 
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building generally does not break a window to regain entry. 
Perhaps the district court has never been locked out of a car, or home, or office, and 
needed to break a window to gain entry. To suggest that such occurrences are totally out of the 
realm of reason, however, reflects the district court's failure to look at the facts in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff. 
The district court takes issue with Mr. Montgomery's reference to the dental lab lights 
being on and his statement that burglars generally prefer not to operate in lit rooms. R. 7 51. One 
objectively reasonable inference that can be drawn from the fact that the lights were on, and that 
Ms. James was still there when the police arrived knowing that she had been seen entering, is 
that she might have a reason to be there. Particularly when she was also seen manipulating 
dental instruments. Mr. Montgomery was simply pointing out that this was another factor for 
officers to consider yet the district court dismissed any favorable inference, finding instead that a 
lit room, during a burglary, was not "unheard of." R. 752. 
The district court concluded that Ms. James had armed herself which added weight to the 
severity of crime analysis. After the district court issued its opinion, Ms. James filed a motion 
for reconsideration and submitted the deposition testimony of Jared Hendryx.2 Mr. Hendryx 
testified, inter alia, that while he was standing next to Officer Butler observing Ms. James she 
was not holding anything in her hands that looked like a weapon or a knife. R. 803. The district 
2 Mr. Hendryx's deposition was initially set for December 12, 2013 but was cancelled when the witness failed to 
appear. Prior to that, Plaintiff had been attempting to secure the testimony ofJ\;1r. Hendryx for several months. 
After the deposition was cancelled, Plaintiff attempted to make contact with Mr. Hendryx no less than 10 times, and 
forwarded an Affidavit for his review and signature. When l\.-Ir. Hendryx became non-responsive, Plaintiff 
subpoenaed his attendance for an appearance at a deposition which was not completed prior to the Court's issuance 
of its Memorandum Opinion. R. 796. 
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court, in denying the Motion to Reconsider, stated that Mr. Hendryx was not trained in 
observation like a police office. The district court also stated that it was possible that Ms. James 
picked up the knife after Mr. Hendryx backed away when another officer joined Mr. Hendryx 
and Officer Butler. See, 4/21/14 Tr., p. 19. Accordingly, the district court concluded that there 
was nothing in the new factual material presented that would alter any aspect of its analysis and 
opinion. R. 819. 
However, Officer Butler testified he only observed Ms. James for seconds rather than 
minutes which is consistent with Mr. Hendryx's testimony that they watched Ms. James for "10 
to 15" seconds before Mr. Hendryx backed away. If Ms. James picked up a knife at some point 
after he backed away, why is Officer Butler the only one who claims that she was holding a 
knife? Moreover, why was the knife never found? Whether or not Ms. James has "armed" 
herself is a question of fact given Mr. Hendryx's testimony. 
As to the effect of being armed, the district court relied upon Mendoza v. Block, 27 F .3d 
1357, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1994), Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009), and 
Edwards v. High Point Police Dep't., 559 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (M.D.N.C. 2008) as support for 
the concept that crimes committed with weapons add weight to the government's scale of the 
severity factor. R. 748. However, these three cases have significant factual differences. 
In Mendoza, the challenged action was not a summary judgment, but an evidentiary 
hearing wherein the plaintiff essentially agreed to allow the court, rather than a jury, to make 
factual determinations about the objective reasonableness of the deputies' conduct and qualified 
immunity. Afendoza, 27 F.3d at 1359, 1363. In 1vfendoza, the crime at hand was a bank robbery, 
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and the suspect had previously been jailed for another bank robbery. Id. at 1358. Likewise, the 
suspect in Crenshaw was suspected of the armed robberies of a Walgreen's Drug Store and a K-
Mart. Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1285. Additionally, the court noted that: 
Crenshaw was suspected of having committed one, and perhaps two, armed 
robberies, which can be characterized as a serious crime. He actively fled from 
the police -- first in his vehicle. and then by foot after crashing his vehicle into a 
marked patrol car -- and attempted to hide in a densely wooded area. And 
because Crenshaw was suspected of armed robbery and was a fugitive from the 
police, Lister had every reason to believe that Crenshaw was armed and 
dangerous. 
Id. at 1292 (emphasis added). In Edwards, another armed robbery was at issue, and the 
store owner was able to tell the police that the suspect was holding a long bladed knife. 
559 F. Supp. 2d at 657. 
In all three cases, Mendoza, Crenshaw, and Edwards, the crime of armed robbery was at 
issue. Armed robberies of stores and banks are generally committed by persons threatening 
bodily harm to innocent people, like a cashier or bank teller, with a weapon. In Mendoza and 
Crenshaw, multiple armed robberies were suspected. Ms. James, at best, was only suspected of a 
single burglary, in an unoccupied dental office, and she did not threaten anyone with a weapon. 
Rather, if Officer Butler is believed, Ms. James picked up some item (which could have been a 
dental instrument) which she was then observed "manipulating" while drinking a beer. Again, 
the record reflects that no "knife" was found. 
Additionally, and drastically dissimilar from the Crenshaw case, Ms. James did not 
actively flee from the police; she did not flee at all, and certainly did not ram a police car during 
an attempt to escape. Moreover, unlike Mendoza, Plaintiff has not subjected herself to the 
37 
factual determinations of the district court in an evidentiary hearing. 
The district court also places great weight on Lowry v. City of San Diego, 2013 U.S. Dist 
LEXIS 77064, *17-18 (S.D. Cal. 2013), in analysis of the severity of crime factor. R. 748. As 
argued by Plaintiff at the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Lowry 
involves a case wherein the police had extremely limited information. The police only knew that 
a burglar alarm had been tripped in an office building late at night, just before 11 :00 pm, and that 
a door was ajar when they arrived. Id at 2-4. The district court, however, felt that the 
circumstances between the two cases were very similar. 
In looking at the totality of the circumstances as it evolved throughout the night, in the 
case at hand, it is clear that the defendant officers this case had much more information than 
what was available to the officers in Lowry. Moreover, the Plaintiffs proffered competent, 
admissible expert testimony that a reasonable police officer would and should have reacted to the 
information that was available. 
In Lowry, the court notes that the plaintiff failed to present any facts that the officers 
could have investigated the crime without the use of the police dog. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 
*20. The court indicates the plaintiff merely proffered that the police could have peered through 
the windows to see the suspect sleeping on a couch. Id at *20-21, n. 8. However, the suite the 
suspect was sleeping in was located on the second floor. Id at *2-3. 
In the case at hand, and quite unlike Lowry, the police had a plethora of information 
available to them after they arrived on scene calling into question whether or not Ms. Jai'Ues was 
actually a burglar. The officers must account for the "totality of the circumstances" before using 
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force to detain or effectuate an arrest. Thus, whether the police officers here acted in an 
objectively reasonable fashion, or as Plaintiff argues, whether a reasonable police officer would 
have taken steps to gather information about who was in the building, and why, before 
unleashing a canine that was going to seriously injure or maim anyone it came into contact with, 
is a question of fact. 
The district court also relies on Gutierrez v. Hackett, 131 F. Appx. 621, 624 (10th Cir. 
2005), as well as Sandoval and Lowry, to say that the police being incorrect in their assumption 
that a burglary was occurring is immaterial. Gutierrez is inapplicable because the court was 
utilizing a drastically different standard of review than is required on a motion for summary 
judgment. 131 F. Appx. 621 at 623-624. In Gutierrez, the court was reviewing a case after the 
jury had rendered a verdict in favor of the Defendant Officer, and it noted that neither the district 
court nor the appellate court could weigh evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. at 
624. In effect, the court was asked to view the facts established by the jury and in the light most 
favorable to [the defendant officer]. Id. In this light, the court affirmed the jury's determination 
that the use of a canine was objectively reasonable, stating that: 
The situation presented a man who broke into an automobile in the middle of the 
night, who would not respond to any of the officers' repeated demands to emerge 
[the officers yelled loudly at the suspect several times, rocked the car, and 
pounded on the trunk lid ... then shouted three warnings that he would deploy his 
police dog unless the suspect came out of the car, but he still did not come out (Id. 
at 623], and who kept his ha..'lds hidden in such a manner as to conceal a weapon. 
As soon as he revealed his hands to the officers, the police dog was called off. 
Id at 624-625. 
Here, Officer Butler made no attempt to contact Ms. James upon first observation and 
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testified that he felt personally threatened despite the fact that he was outside, upstairs, 6-8 feet 
from the window well and Ms. James was inside, in the basement. In Gutierrez, it would be hard 
to dispute that the officers did everything in their power to obtain the attention of a sober 
individual and provide ample warning. The suspect was clearly visible through the car windows, 
and the police could visibly see the suspect not responding. 
The severity of the crime factor is not definitively in favor of the Defendants. Rather, the 
district court was required to take all reasonable inferences from the factual record in Ms. James' 
favor and then decide, based on that record, what the severity of crime actually was. Ms. James 
submitted competent, admissible and unopposed expert testimony which supported the position 
that the officers should have questioned whether a burglary was actually ongoing and whether 
the person in the building was actually there with any criminal intent 
E. The District Court Erred in Making the Factual Determination that Ms. 
James Posed an Immediate Threat to the Police. 
The Plaintiffs put forth evidence that Ms. James was not an "immediate" threat to the 
police. Specifically, Mr. Montgomery's affidavit states, pertinently, as follows: 
[T]here is not any reasonable evidence to suggest that the suspect was an "immediate" 
threat to the officers. The suspect was reported to be "lethargic" and "totally out of it, 
which does not imply that she was or would be an "immediate" threat. Also, for the 
reasons identified above, the officers had information which suggested that the person 
inside may well have a right to be there because she worked in the dental lab and was 
actually seen doing something that would be consistent with working, i.e. manipulating 
dental instruments. 
**** 
In addition, all officers who were asked testified that there was no urgency and the 
perimeter of the building was secure which is simply inconsistent with the idea that 
person inside posed an "immediate" threat to someone. While Officer Butler stated 
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she had a knife, there is contradictory testimony from Officer Barber who said that he 
understood that she was holding a bladed tool, based on what Officer Butler described. 3 
Regardless, there is no evidence reflecting what the suspect was doing with the knife or 
bladed tool. The only report of any affirmative acts of the suspect was that she was seen 
manipulating (using) dental instruments. 
Courts place great weight on the immediate threat factor. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 
F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005). Threats must consist of objective circumstances beyond an 
officer's statement that he feared for his safety and the safety of others. Bryan v. MacPherson, 
630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010). Even if circumstances present the potential for a threat to 
safety, those circumstances must be carefully evaluated to determine if the threat is actually 
immediate. When a suspect is not engaging in threatening behavior, and in the absence of 
urgency, it is less likely that an immediate threat is present. When reasonable minds could differ 
on whether or not an immediate threat existed. then it should be left to the jury to make the 
determination. See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1442 (emphasis added). 
The district court erred in making the factual determination that "[t]he Defendant officers 
were entitled to assume James posed an immediate threat" because the district court simply 
failed to view the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff before engaging in its analysis as 
to what a reasonably objective police would or would not do. 
The district court identified the several factors in determining that it was objectively 
reasonable to conclude Ms. James posed an immediate threat. R. 753. Each will be addressed in 
turn. 
3 Jared Hendryx's deposition was not available to Mr. Montgomery but would certainly add further foundation to his 
opinions. 
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1. Ms. James was Armed with a Bladed Tool. 
The term "armed" implies an act with intent. Officer Butler, the only officer who admits 
to having observed Ms. James before the incident, states that he observed Ms. James holding a 
beer in her left hand and manipulating several sharp dental instruments and a knife in her right 
hand. He did not state in his written report that she had "armed" herself. Pertinently, the 
alleged "knife" was never found by the officers after the incident. More pertinently, Jared 
Hendryx, testified that he was with an officer observing Ms. James and he did not see her 
holding anything that looked like a weapon, such as a knife. R. 414, 803. The district court was 
presented with Mr. Hendryx' s testimony and stated that it would not change its analysis. 
As noted by Mr. Montgomery, there is nothing in the record to indicate, even if Ms. 
James were holding a bladed tool, or a knife, or a sharp dental instrument, that she was 
threatening anyone. The only activity reported by the officers, or Mr. Hendryx, is that she was 
standing in the basement, drinking a beer manipulating dental instruments. 
As noted above, threats must consist of objective circumstances beyond an officer's 
statement that he feared for his safety and the safety of others. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 
at 826. Here, Officer Butler was standing on the ground level outside the building, six to eight 
feet from the window well, looking into the window at a suspect that was located inside the 
building in the basement. He testified that he feared for his personal safety, at that time, because 
of the "nature of the call, the nature of the alleged crime, the fact that she was clearly armed, and 
the unknown circumstances of any other additional suspects." R. 431. Officer Butler had been 
advised by Mr. Hendryx that he had seen no other person and whether or not Officer Butler's 
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personal belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances then existing, is clearly a 
question of fact. 
2. Ms. James was Intoxicated. 
The Plaintiff was intoxicated. In fact, she was described by the witness as lethargic and 
totally out of it. While the Court takes her intoxicated state as an indicator of potential violence, 
the real facts from the only known observations of the officers are that: she was first seen in the 
same location where she had entered the building, in a lit room, drinking a beer and she was 
manipulating dental instruments and holding a knife in a dental lab. There is no objective or 
outward indication by words or actions which reflect that Ms. James was threating or attempting 
to threaten anyone. 
3. Ms. James was Hiding in the Basement of a "Largely Dark Building" 
that was Unfamiliar to the Officers. 
The conclusion that Ms. James was "hiding" is primarily based on the unheeded 
warnings. That is so because there is no evidence that Ms. James was aware that the police 
officers were even there. Evidence is disputed as to whether the officers attempted to look into 
the lit dental lab for signs of activity. For example, Officer Bonas and Sgt. Kukla both testified 
that officers have been trained not to approach the building. Ms. James, on the other ha.11d, 
testified that after re-entering the building she finished working on the denture and then went to 
the bathroom, a process which took at least 40 minutes. Thus, was there to be seen. 
The district court found that Ms. James was hiding based on her refusal to respond to the 
PA and canine announcements. This is discussed in greater detail below, however, it is pertinent 
to note that there is substantial dispute over the number of warnings and the timing. For 
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example, the Court makes the statement that at least four warnings were issued "within a 
maximum time period of 30 minutes." R. 760, 761. This cannot be reconciled, however, with the 
testimony of Officer Bonas who testified that all warnings were given after the decision to use 
the dog was made. That occurred seven minutes after he arrived. The record reflects that entry 
was made into the building one minute and 23 seconds after that and that officers were in the 
building for approximately 12 minutes before the canine attacked Ms. James. R. 411, 412. 
Thus, the entire time available to give warnings, per Officer Bonas, could not exceed 13 to 14 
minutes, which included the time inside the building. 
4. The Officers were Tactically Disadvantaged. 
The officers were only disadvantaged if they made a choice to enter the building. Before 
that decision was made, the officers had the opportunity, and information, to determine that the 
person inside the building worked in the dental lab and was there legitimately with no criminal 
intent. Even then, the tactical disadvantage was lessened given the presence of the owner who 
was available to provide a description and layout of the building. 
5. The Dental Lab had Items with the Potential to Become a Weapon. 
The same rationale from above applies. While there is no evidence that the dental lab 
had items that were capable of becoming weapons, (i.e. were sharp instruments left out or were 
they under lock and key) even if assumed, it is pertinent only if the officers made a choice to 
enter the building. As noted in Chew, supra., even if circumstances present the potential for a 
treat, those circumsta11ces must be evaluated carefully to determine if the threat is actually 
immediate. 
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Again, there was no sense of urgency. Officer Butler milled around his northeast corner 
for about an hour while additional units arrived and a perimeter was established. R. 431. Officer 
Barber specifically stated: "We weren't really that urgent. We had the building locked down. The 
person wasn't going anywhere." R. 466. Lt. Schoenborn recalls that he was able to "methodically 
at a reasonable pace evaluate the situation," and that there was no sense of urgency. R. 545. 
Sergeant Kukla also stated there was no sense of urgency. R. 482. At no time prior to entry did 
the officers reasonably feel threatened. 
6. The Case Law is Distinguishable. 
In terms of case law, the district court again relies primarily on Miller v. Clark County, 
Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909, 912 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1988), and Lowry v. City of San Diego, 
infra. R. 753, 754. The Plaintiff relied on Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994). The 
district court spent considerable time distinguishing Chew, stating it was "cobbled together" and 
its opinion regarding the immediate threat factor is "unique." R. 754-756. 
Miller, Robinette, and Lowry are plainly distinguishable, however. One need not go 
much further than the district court's own presentation of Miller v. Clark County to find key 
differences making the suspect in that case far more threatening than Ms. James: 
... the suspect defied orders to stop and fled into dark woods with "treacherous" 
terrain ignored warnings that a police dog would be deployed, was wanted for a 
prior felony of fleeing from police in a manner which evinced "a willingness to 
threaten others' safety, " potentially had mental health problems and was known 
to be not "lm-v enforcement friendly." Further, The officers found a large knife in 
the car from which suspect fled, indicating he had a propensity to carry a 
weapon. 
R. 753. The suspect in Miller was thought to have stolen a car. lvfiller, 340 F.3d at 960. In this 
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particular instance, the suspect forced the officers to chase him "through underbrush, over 
electric fences, and across a field before arriving at some dense, dark, wooded terrain." Id at 
960-961. On a previous occasion, the suspect had fled from police in his car with a "wanton or 
willful disregard for the lives of others," a felony. Id at 960. The neighbors provided the police 
with information that the suspect was not law enforcement friendly, and the knife found in the 
stolen car was 7-8 inches in length. Id. Of additional note, is that Miller's excessive force claim 
went to a bench trial rather than a jury trial, and the district judge determined the use of force 
was reasonable, and the appellate judge was sorting through factual determinations made by the 
district court judge, after trial. Id. at 960, n. 1, 961. 
Ms. James did not flee. At best she was hiding, and even this is a contested issue. Ms. 
James was confined in a dental office with a full police perimeter established. Officers had no 
reason to believe she was wanted for prior felonies, especially fleeing police in a manner 
threatening the safety of others. Quite the opposite, once spotted by the witness Hendryx, she 
did not flee and continued into the building and was still there when police arrived later, even 
though she knew she had been seen. Additionally, the police had no reason to believe Ms. James 
was unfriendly towards police; her "weapon" may well have been a dental instrument which she 
was using in a dental lab, and the officers had information that she may have worked there. 
Furthermore, Ms. James was initially described as lethargic and she was not observed, nor was it 
reported, that she had engaged any kind of threatening behavior. 
In Robinette, the police responded to a burglary when an alarm was tripped just after 
midnight. 854 F.2d at 910. entire car dealership building and bay area was dark, and the 
46 
police knew the suspect was aware of their presence because he had been seen by the police 
looking out at them. Id at 910-911. The officer shouted three K-9 warnings which they knew 
were heard because they knew where the suspect was. Id. at 911, 913. 
Ms. James, however, was in a dental office with the basement dental lab fully lit on a 
Sunday evening at 5:30 p.m. The police had information that she entered the building to obtain 
her keys; whereas in Robinette, the police had absolutely no information about the intentions of 
the suspect. While the police initially observed Ms. James, there is no indication that she knew 
the police were present. Despite a broken window and being just outside the window well, 
Officer Butler chose not to announce his presence even though, as noted, Ms. James was in the 
same location she entered in and had been for at least 8 minutes or longer. 
In Chew, the suspect actively fled into a scrapyard to hide. 27 F.3d at 1436. The suspect 
had three outstanding felony warrants for his arrest. Id. at 1436, 1442. A perimeter was 
established, and a helicopter and canine units were present to assist in the search. Id. at 1436. 
The canine unit was not unleashed to search for the suspect until two hours after he had fled from 
the police. Id. The dog bit and seized the suspect out of view from the officer. Id. The suspect 
stated he offered no physical resistance, but the officer ordered the dog to attack; however, the 
officer contended that the suspect was hitting the dog with a pipe. Id. The court determined that 
a rational jury could find the suspect "posed no immediate safety threat to anyone" because the 
suspect had not engaged in any threatening behavior, and did nothing other than hide. Id. at 
1442 ( emphasis in the original). 
The district court cites to the dissent of Judge Trott: 
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Chew obviously was not going to surrender on his own initiative ... Nightfall was 
approaching. It is naive to believe Chew was not buying time until darkness 
became his ally. Should the police have left their dogs in their kennels and 
conducted a massive dumpster by dumpster search for Chew before it got dark? Is 
that the reasonable way to conduct this operation? Were the police required to 
maintain their perimeter until they starved Chew out? Should the police have 
given up and gone home? 
R. 756. However, Judge Trott never specifically states that the suspect posed an immediate 
threat to officer safety and, regardless, his view is still that of the dissent. Even if Judge Trott' s 
rationale is somehow more persuasive, there are factual distinctions between that case and Ms. 
James situation that the district court simply passed over. 
It is unknown whether Ms. James would have surrendered on her own because there is no 
evidence that she was aware of their presence and the nature and quality of the warnings is in 
dispute. Ms. James was only suspected of a single felony burglary, rather than three felonies, 
and the police had reason to question whether she was actually a burglar. In Chew, the incident 
was outside at a large scrapyard, a location that would be much easier to escape from under 
cover of darkness even with an established perimeter and the roving spotlight from a helicopter. 
Here, Ms. James was confined within a small building and the police had all exits covered to 
prevent her escape. 
The district court states the im1nediacy of threat must be evaluated from the officer's 
perspective once they were in the building. However, that is only part of analysis and does 
not square with the requirement that use of force must be justified, in the first instance, by a...11 
objective view that the suspect is an immediate threat at the time the decision is made. 
As stated in Chew, when a suspect is not engaging in threatening behavior, and in the 
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absence of urgency, it is less likely that an immediate threat is present and if reasonable minds 
could differ on whether or not an immediate threat existed, then it should be left to the jury to 
make the determination. That is the situation presented here and the district court erred in 
finding this factor weighed heavily in the governments favor. 
F. The District Court Erred in Making the Factual Determination that Ms. 
James was Actively Resisting and Evading Arrest by Hiding. 
The district court accepted the Defendants' position that Ms. James was "actively 
resisting arrest" which was also based on her failure to surrender following the canine warnings. 
However, if, as Plaintiff argued, no warnings were issued before the decision to deploy a canine 
had been made, the suspect's failure to respond cannot be a basis to conclude, initially, that she 
was actively resisting arrest. 
Officer Bonas, the canine officer, conceded that the decision to take the dog out of the 
police car was a deployment of the dog. Officer Bonas agreed that the decision to utilize the dog 
occurred within approximately seven minutes of his arrival. The dog was unleashed and in the 
building one minute and 23 seconds later. Officer Bonas also testified that all commands to 
surrender were made were made after the decision to deploy the dog. Thus, all warnings or 
commands to surrender were made in the one minute and 23 second time span between taking 
the dog out of the car and entry into the building. 
The district court concluded, without regard for the logical inferences from the facts, that 
the officers reasonably believed Ms. James was "intentionally eluding and thus evading" because 
she ignored a PA announcement and three subsequent warnings by Officer Bonas. As noted, the 
district court believed these warnings occurred over a 30 minute period. However, since dog 
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was unleashed and in the building before two of the warnings were given, the salient question in 
determining whether the officers reasonably believed she was resisting arrest because of 
nomesponse to the warnings is what warnings were given, and when, prior to taking the dog off 
leash. Whatever warnings were given, whether it be a PA and the verbal announcement by 
Officer Bonas, or just the latter, the warnings were necessarily given in the one minute and 23 
second time frame between taking the dog out of the car and entering the building. Whether 
failure to respond within one minute and 23 seconds to a warning issued on the top level of a 
multilevel building reasonably justifies a conclusion that Ms. James was intentionally eluding, 
and thus evading arrest, is a factual question for the jury to decide. 
The district court also makes repeated reference to the fact that Officer Bonas continued 
to give warnings while in the building. While factually accurate, BPD policy states that canine 
warnings "shall" be given on each level of all multilevel structures. If tactical considerations 
prohibit a canine warning, the officer is required to document the reasons for such failure in the 
deployment report and any other administrative reports. The deployment report authored by 
Officer Bonas contains no discussion, let alone documentation, for his failure to follow policy 
and procedure and issue a canine warning on the basement level of the multilevel structure. (R. 
350, 363, 364). 
The district court dismissed this aspect of Plaintiffs' argument entirely and similarly 
misinterpreted the language of the policy, stating: 
the policy does not require the giving of an announcement on each 
level if the "tactical considerations" preclude it. It is undisputed 
that tactical situation did not permit the officers to safely go 
down the stairs and expose themselves to give an announcement. 
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Instead, as is evident from the audio, the officers gave an 
announcement at the top of the stairs and did so loud enough such 
that it was reasonable to believe anyone in the basement would 
hearit. R. 761. 
First, contrary to the district court's statement, the policy plainly states that failure to give 
warnings for tactical considerations must be documented in the deployment report. R. 350. 
Since there is no such documentation, there are no "facts" from which the district court could 
determine that the tactical considerations justified departure from the policy. The court cites to 
no evidence in the record which supports its view that this fact was "undisputed." Absent any 
evidence in the records as to the layout of the basement, the thickness of the walls, and whether 
rooms had doors open or shut, for example, it is wholly conclusory to state that the 
announcement at the top of the stairs was loud enough that "anyone in the basement" would hear 
it. Such fact finding, aside from being without any support in the record, is simply beyond the 
role of the district court in the face of a summary judgment motion 
Ms. James also pointed out that BPD policy defined active and passive resistance in its 
use of force policy as follows: 
Resistance: Actions which seek to evade an officer's attempts of control, directed from a 
subject towards an officer. Types of resistance include: 
• Active Aggression: Physical actions or assaults against the officer or another 
person with less than deadly force ( e.g., advancing, challenging, punching, 
kicking, grabbing, VvTestling, etc.). 
• Passive: Any type of resistance where the subject does not attempt to 
defeat the officer's attempt to touch or control him/her, but he/she still will not 
voluntarily comply with verbal and physical attempts of control ( e.g., dead 
weight, does not react to verbal commands, etc.). 
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R. 622,623. 
Use of canines is considered by BPD as an Intermediate Weapon, defined and authorized 
as follows: 
1.02.00 Intermediate Weapons 
An officer is authorized to carry and use an intermediate weapon to gain control 
when faced with actual or threatened physical resistance and the use of an 
intermediate weapon is reasonably necessary based on officer-to-subject disparity, 
reaction times, environmental conditions, and the totality of the circumstances. 
Physical resistance includes all physical resistance, except passive phvsical 
resistance. 
R. 627 ( emphasis added). 
By definition under BPD policy, when a suspect "does not react to verbal commands" or 
fails to voluntarily comply with verbal attempts at control, the resistance is deemed passive. Use 
of canines, as an intermediate weapon, is authorized when the officer needs to gain control when 
faced with actual or threatened physical resistance which, by definition, does not include passive 
physical resistance. 
In rejecting Plaintiffs argument here, the district court noted that the BPD policy also 
authorized police canines for building searches where a suspect may be hiding. Thus, the court 
found Plaintiffs argument circular and inconsistent and found that "passively resistant", as 
defined, applies only to suspects an officer actually encounters, rather than someone who is 
hiding. R. 759. 
Ms. James did not write the policies and procedures for BPD and if there is an 
inconsistency in the BPD policy, then there must be some evidence from which the court or the 
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jury can determine what was intended. More importantly, the BPD policy on use of canines 
does not simply authorize use of canines for suspects "hiding" in a building. In fact, the word 
"hiding" never appears in the policy. Rather, it states canine use is authorized for building 
searches when a search by officers would create an unnecessary risk to the officers attempt to 
control the suspect. R. 588, 589. The officers must still follow the policies regarding intermediate 
use of force and assess the totality of circumstances. Thus, whether Ms. James was "actively 
resisting" vs. "passively resistant" is a relevant factor and, again, highly factual in nature. 
G. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Additional Factors Also 
Weighed in the Defendants' Favor. 
The additional factors to be considered when looking at the totality of the circumstances, 
include such things as warnings, alternate levels of force, or the conformity of the defendant 
officers' actions with department guidelines. See, Jones v. Kootenai County, 2011 WL at * 10, 
citing Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018,1030 (9th Cir. 2010). Additionally, whether the 
suspect was emotionally disturbed or intoxicated may be relevant. Glenn v. Washington County, 
673 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2011). 
1. Warnings. 
Although the district court found it undisputed that at least one PA announcement and 
three verbal warnings were given over the span of 30 minutes, Ms. James never conceded that a 
PA announcement was given and the court's conclusion cannot be supported. The foundation 
for Plaintiff's position is simply stated. Officers are required to write reports and to document all 
pertinent information in those reports. The purpose of documentation is to create a written 
record of what happened. fact, the canine officer is specifically required to issue a written 
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report to his supervisor which sets forth the particular facts relied upon which justified the use of 
a canine and even more documentation is required when the canine engages and injures 
someone. R. 590,591. Not a single officer documented one, let alone several, PA warnings.4 
The first time that plaintiff learned that the officers in this case were claiming that 
multiple PA announcements had been made was in deposition. Even then, the officers gave 
inconsistent testimony about the PA announcements. Officer Barber, for example, testified that 
he moved his patrol car close to the building for purposes of giving the PA announcement. 
Officer Butler, however, states that the PA announcement was made from his car. He also states 
that there were multiple PA announcements and the first was given at least 10 minutes, and 
perhaps 20 minutes, before entry was made into the building with the canine. 
Thus, according to Officer Butler, the first PA announcement about use of a canine was 
given before Officer Bonas had even arrived with the dog and before the decision to deploy was 
made. Officer Bonas, however, testified that warnings, including PA announcements, would not 
be given until after the dog is deployed, i.e. out of the car, because the dog is useless if it is in 
the car and a suspect bolts out of the building and takes off. R. 516. 
Jared Hendryx testified that he heard no canine warnings over the PA. \Vhile he tempered 
that testimony by stating the home had expensive and thicker windows, he conceded that he was 
able to hear sirens from emergency vehicles passing on adjacent Cole Road. R. 803. 
Whether or not a PA announcement was given is clearly disputed and it is a genuine issue 
of fact because the district court bases much of its analysis that Ms. James was hiding and 
4 As noted in Frunz, the court found an officer's testimony above certain events at trial, which had not previously 
appeared in affidavits or discovery responses, sufficiently inconsistent to support a finding by a jury that the officer 
was not truthful. Frunz, 468 F.3d at 1145. 
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actively resisting arrest on the belief that she was given multiple warnings, with ample time to 
respond, and failed to do so. 
2. Alternate Levels of Force. 
The district court incorrectly finds that there were no adequate alternative levels of force 
available to officers. The district court only mentions, however, items such as "guns, tasers, and 
40 mm non-lethal gun[s]" as available. R. 764. The district court also seems to limit its 
consideration to the period of time after the police decided to enter the darkened portion of the 
building. Prior to entry, however, the police had an hour long period of time to follow up on 
investigative leads and to determine if any force was necessary. 
In addition, BPD states that it follows the handler control (HC) method regarding canine 
use. R. 573. That means the handler can command the canine to bark and hold a suspect, if 
found, or bite and hold a suspect. If true, Officer Bonas had the ability to command the canine 
to bark, rather than bite Ms. James, when she was located. Although, as discussed later, Officer 
Bonas disputes that this is the actual policy, this is similarly an alternate level of force. 
3. Compliance with Policy. 
This issue has also been well addressed above. To summarize, BPD's policy states that 
before using a canine to search a building officers should contact the building owner, if possible, 
and determine if there are tenants and obtain a layout of the building. Before the canine search 
commences, policy states that all tenants, workers shall be evacuated from the facility. R. 589. 
Here, the officers chose to stop a conversation with the cleaning lady who had advised 
that a female worked in the basement a.'1.d was willing to provide a description. If the officers are 
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required by policy to inquire about tenancy relationships, and if the officers are required by 
policy to evacuate tenants, workers or others from the facility, the failure of the officers to follow 
up on the information presented by the cleaning lady is a clear violation of policy. Mr. 
Montgomery testified that it was completely unreasonable for the police officers to not follow up 
on the information. R. 683. 
Regardless, against that background, the district court made the following conclusion: 
With regard to the alleged failure to follow up on information that the building had 
tenants, the policy only mandates that "[w]henever possible, the building's owner should 
be contacted to determine whether there may be tenants or others in the building and to 
ascertain the building's layout." Here, the building's owner was contacted, the officers 
learned that tenants leased space, but the owner effectively stated that no tenant or 
anyone else who had a right to be there would have to enter by breaking a window. 
Despite James arguments to the contrary, there was no reason for responding police to 
believe that James, who entered by breaking the basement window in a heavily 
intoxicated state and was seen briefly in the basement drinking a beer, was a tenant. 
R. 762, 763 ( emphasis added). 
The district court erred on numerous fronts. First, the district court was obligated to view 
the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Second, it ignores that the policy also required 
the responding police officers to evacuate tenants, workers, or others from the building prior to 
entering with a canine. Third, and directly contrary to the district courts statement, the police 
officers were told by the cleaning lady that other people, including a female, worked in the 
basement and she was cut off when she tried to describe that person. Thus, the officers were 
directly given a reason to believe that female the dental lab, in the basement, may have 
been an tenant and/or someone who worked in the building. 
As noted previously, Officer Bonas also violated policy by failing to give warnings on 
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the basement level and failing to document the reasons for not doing so. The officers also made 
a determination to use a canine despite the fact that there was no evidence of actual or threatened 
physical resistance by Ms. James, as defined by policy. The district court failed to address these 
factual issues relative to policy violations or to even consider that a jury could find that the 
policies had been violated such that this factor weighed in Plaintiff's favor. 
4. Plaintiff's Emotional State. 
The district court considered the mental or emotional state of Ms. James and relied on 
Luchtel v. Hagerman, 623 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2010) to support a conclusion that "[p]eople 
under the influence of mood-altering substances often act in an unpredictable, irrational 
manner ... they can exhibit superhuman strength and, despite their physical size, can inflict 
serious injuries while resisting arrest." R. 761. 
While the Luchtel case does contain the quoted lai.,guage, to suggest that similar facts 
existed here is simply unjust. In Luchtel, the suspect was on crack cocaine, threatened to harm 
herself, and stated she thought the police were assassins, and grabbed an elderly neighbor for 
protection. Id. at 977. The officers provided a description of a person was very likely to become 
aggressive: "[The suspect's] eyes were wide, her breathing was rapid, her muscles were taught, 
and she looked like she was 'ready to spring."' Id. The suspect "went ballistic" upon the 
officer's arrival. Id. While the officers attempted to handcuff her, she attempted "strike, scratch 
and bite them." Id. at 978. 
contrast, Ms. James was described as being lethargic, a description that reflects 
someone who is docile rather than aggressive. There is no evidence that Ms. James ever 
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exhibited aggressive behavior or threatened to harm anyone. She made no verbal threats and, as 
noted by Jared Hendryx, she was standing in the room, drinking a beer, not really doing 
anything. R. 802. While it is factually disputed as to whether she had "armed herself' with a 
knife, the facts suggest that whatever she was doing with the knife, if she had one, it was in 
connection with her manipulation of dental instruments in a dental lab. 
It is also worth noting that the district court stated that "James does not contest that she 
was significantly under the influence of alcohol and tested positive for marijuana use." While it 
is true that Ms. James did not contest that she was under the influence of alcohol, she did contest 
the relevance of the marijuana result because there was no record or evidence that would explain 
or otherwise reflect that her marijuana use, if any, occurred on the day of the incident. R. 366, 
372. In fact, a motion in limine to exclude any evidence or reference to the positive marijuana 
test was filed, argued and GR..L\..~TED by the district court on the same day as the summary 
judgment hearing. R. 366, 372; 2/19/14 Tr., p. 98. Yet, the district court used and considered 
the evidence as pertinent to its own factual findings on several occasions. It was therefore error 
for the district court to consider, and reference, the positive marijuana test given that it would not 
have allowed a jury to consider the very same evidence. 
H. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claim Against Defendant Officers Should not be Dismissed 
Because Reasonable Minds Could Determine that the Governmental Interest 
is Outweighed by the Level of Intrusion Against Plaintiff Melene James' 
Rights. 
In the final balancing process, there are too many factual disputes regarding key issues 
for summary judgment to be appropriate. Starting with the nature and quality of the intrusion 
against Ms. James' fourth amendment rights, to the factors outlined in Graham v. Connor, the 
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factual disputes riddling the district courts governmental interest analysis are enough to keep 
summary judgment at bay. 
The following factual disputes are interrelated among the multiple factors to be 
considered: (1) whether it was objectively reasonable for Officer Butler, and the other officers, to 
believe that Ms. James posed an "immediate threat" to officer safety and the safety of others; (2) 
whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to continue to believe Ms. James was a 
burglar as the situation evolved; (3) whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to 
believe Ms. James was "armed" with a weapon; ( 4) whether it was objectively reasonable for the 
police to believe Ms. James level of intoxication made her more of a threat; (5) whether it was 
objectively reasonable for the police to stop the conversation with the clea11ing lady after she 
indicated that a female worked in the building and she was willing to provide a description; (6) 
whether it was objectively reasonable to ignore the comments of the cleaning lady because of 
what the building owner said regarding persons in the building, particularly given the officers' 
affirmative duty to identify and evacuate any tenant, workers or others who may be in the 
building (7) whether or not any PA announcements were made; (8) whether one minute and 23 
seconds was a reasonable time to allow Ms. James to respond to warnings; (9) whether it was 
objectively reasonable for the police to believe Ms. James was refusing to respond to their 
announcements and was hiding and actively resisting arrest based on her failure to respond to 
warnings; and (10) whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to believe there were no 
lesser alternative means of force available to the police. 
At the summary judgment stage, all factual disputes a...rid all reasonable inferences from 
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the facts, whether in dispute or not, should have been resolved in favor of the Plaintiff. Had it 
done so, the district court should have been constrained to find that genuine factual issues existed 
as to whether or not Ms. James constitutional rights had been violated and summary judgment 
should not have been granted on this issue. 
1. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiff's § 1983 Excessive 
Force ("Monell Claim") against the City of Boise. 
Even though it acknowledged that the defendant's had not moved for summary judgment 
as to whether there was a Monell Claim against the City of Boise, the district court granted 
summary judgment anyway. Whether or not Plaintiffs complaint asserted a Monell Claim 
against the City of Boise was never at issue. Parties are not required to respond to issues which 
are not raised by the opposing party. 
2. The District Court Erred in Granting Immunity to the Individual 
Officers. 
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides a public official with immunity from 
liability in a civil action for damages, provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly 
established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982). The 
analysis employed in determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity 
consists of two inquiries. First, "taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the court must 
consider whether the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." If 
a violation of a constitutional right can be found, then the court must consider whether the right 
at issue, in the context of the facts and circumsta..11ces of the case, was clearly established. 
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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) at 201. 
In the first instance, the district court noted that it did not find a constitutional violation 
but determined that immunity would be granted even if it had. For all the reasons stated above, 
and because the district court erred by finding no factual disputes rather than viewing the record 
in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the question of whether or not there was a constitutional 
violation must be answered affirmatively. It follows that the nature of the violation shapes the 
analysis as to whether a reasonable police officer would have understood that they were violating 
the Ms. James' constitutional right. 
The constitutional violation, as argued by Ms. James was simply stated. She had the 
basic and fundamental right not to be attacked by a police dog simply because she was mistaken 
for a burglar by overzealous police officers. The law is well settled that force by a police officer 
is least justified against nonviolent offenders who do not or actively resist arrest and pose 
little or no threat to the security of the officers or the public. Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 
574 F.3d at 499 (citing Casey v. City of Fed Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). The law is clearly established that "where there is no need 
for force, any force used is constitutionally unreasonable." Headwaters Forest Defense v. County 
of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis is original), vacated on other 
grounds, County of Humboldt v. Headwaters Forest Defense, 534 U.S. 801, 122 S. Ct. 24, 151 L. 
Ed. 2d 1 (2001). Such fundamental concepts are easily within the grasp of any trained police 
officer and, certainly, consistent with the stated policies of BPD which the officers are presumed 
to know. R. 586,623. 
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Here, it is the Plaintiffs basic contention that no force was necessary because had the 
officers reasonably evaluated the totality of circumstances it was highly likely that they would 
have discovered who the suspect was and why she was there. Moreover, the facts which the 
Court must look at to determine qualified immunity are the same as those which the Court 
assesses to determine whether the force that was used was excessive and constitutionally 
impermissible. See, Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 885 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining to 
evaluate qualified immunity separate from that of summary judgment on the merits because "the 
qualified immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry made on the merits"); see also, Scott v. 
Henrich, 39 F.3d 912,914 (9th Cir.1994). Thus, if there are questions of fact as to whether the 
force at issue was excessive, it only follows, logically, that questions of fact must similarly exist 
as to whether any force was reasonable. 
The district court failed to not only assess the facts in light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
but also in failing to fully acknowledge and understand the plain language BPD policies as 
related to this case. While the district court, and the Defendants, relied heavily on their 
purported compliance with policy, Ms. James has identified at least two if not three undisputed 
failures by the officers to follow the written policies of the BPD. 
The district court was critical of Ms. James for failing to articulate a narrowly and clearly 
defined constitutional right of which objectively reasonable police officers would be aware. 
That, of course, is a self-defeating proposition for any litigant, plaintiff or defendant, because it 
forces the litigant to guess what the court deems specifically narrow enough to fit whatever 
undefined parameter it will ultimately use. 
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The case law speaks clearly that a police officer is charged with understanding that, while 
use of force is authorized, it is done so on a plainly sliding scale and that the passive, non-violent 
offender who poses little or no threat dictates the least amount of force possible in effectuating 
an arrest. Moreover, it is undisputed that use of canines is a use of significant force and failing 
to follow policy in the use of a canine that can obviously do serious injury to someone is, by 
definition, an unreasonable and unjustified use of force. 
The only hard facts the officers had relative to Ms. James was that she was seen entering 
a dental lab through a broken window with the stated reason that she had locked herself out. She 
was intoxicated, or impaired, but also lethargic and was observed, some eight minutes after being 
seen entering the building, in the same location, holding a beer and manipulating instruments, 
one of which an officer believed to be a knife. She was not threatening anyone. She was not 
aggressive, and as stated by Mr. Hendryx, she was not doing much of anything. Rather than 
simply call to her through the broken window and ask what she was doing, the officers started 
down a path of immediately calling for a bite dog and then securing the perimeter until the dog 
arrived. 5 
When it comes to use of force, and particularly canines, the officers are aware that an 
improper use of a canine implicates constitutional rights because that necessarily means a 
suspect, or are otherwise innocent bystander, has been subjected to an improper use of force. 
There is substantial evidence in record which reflects that officers failed to follow policy 
which means that they were aware or should have been aware that their actions would violate the 
5 The dispatch record shows that a bite dog was requested 10 minutes after officers arrived. R. 410. 
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constitutional rights of the suspect. 
I. State Law Claims. 
1. The District Court Erred in Granting Immunity Under I.C. § 25-2808. 
The Defendants argue that all State claims are subject to dismissal on the basis of Idaho 
Code § 25-2808 which provides: 
Neither the State of Idaho, nor any city or county, nor any peace officer employed 
by any of them, shall be ... civilly liable in damages for injury committed by a dog 
when: (1) the dog has been trained to assist in law enforcement; and (2) the injury 
occurs while the dog is reasonably and carefully being used in the apprehension, 
arrest or location a suspected off ender or in maintaining or controlling the 
public order. 
The district court stated: 
This Court has determined that the facts here are almost entirely undisputed and, in 
viewing these facts in a light most favorable to James, the officers' conduct met the 
"objectively reasonable" standard of the 4th Amendment. 
R. 771 (emphasis added). 
Under the plain language of Idaho Code § 25-2808, there is no immunity unless the dog 
was used "reasonably and carefully." Those words are inherently factual. While the district 
court correctly noted that the Plaintiff conceded that the absence of a constitutional violation 
would likely lead to a conclusion that the dog was used reasonably and carefully, the converse is 
true. In other words, if the dog was deployed before the officers had complied with BPD policy, 
or in contravention to policy, then it cannot be said that the use of the dog was reasonable and 
careful when those policies when it is and is not appropriate to deploy the ca.riine. 
Similarly, this court finds that the district cou.."1: did not view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, which seems apparent, then district court's analysis here simply 
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fails. 
2. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims for Assault, 
Battery, False Arrest, and Wrongful Imprisonment. 
The only issue raised by the defendants as to these claims centered on whether Ms. James 
could establish that the officers acted with malice or criminal intent. Absent such proof, the 
officers are immune from liability. Plaintiff noted that, under Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 
Idaho 176 (1986), the legal definitions as to "malice" or "criminal intent" are different, if only 
slightly, in that the former requires some proof of ill will where the latter does not. Criminal 
intent is defined as the commission of intentional wrongful or unlawful act without legal 
justification, or excuse, whether or not injury was intended. Id. Ms. James conceded that the 
record did not support a conclusion that the officers, or the City, acted with ill will. 
The district court noted Ms. James argument that the evidence would support a theory of 
criminal intent, but disagreed, stating that the officers' apprehension of James was not a 
proscribed act. According to the district court, the "undisputed facts" gave the officers a basis to 
reasonably believe that a burglary was in progress and the suspect was armed, or at least could be 
armed, was intoxicated and hiding. R. 773. 
However, there are questions of fact as to whether the officers acted reasonably in 
concluding that a burglary was in process, they failed to follow through on information that the 
person in the building actually worked in the dental lab and they acted contrary to policy and 
procedure. the force used in this case was excessive and in violation of Ms. James 
constitutional rights, if the officers failed to follow established BPD policy which is designed to 
protect a citizen's right to be free of excessive action, then, the 
officers have committed an intentional, and wrnngful act, without excuse or justification, 
whether or not injury was intended. See, Dunn v. Nance, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58131 (D. 
Idaho, July 6, 2009) (summary judgment was not warranted on state law assault and battery 
claims because there was question of fact as to whether the dog handler acted with malice or 
criminal intent where the Court found question of fact on whether force was excessive, and 
therefore, potentially unconstitutional). Accordingly, summary judgment should not have been 
granted on these claims. 
3. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiff's Claim for 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
In dismissing this claim, the district court stated: 
Here, the Court has found the Defendants' response to the incident at issue was 
constitutionally appropriate. The dog was justifiably deployed to apprehend James 
and the attack lasted no longer than necessary to secure her arrest. While the 
conduct of a private individual letting loose a dog to violently bite a person would 
be potentially sufficiently outrageous to support this claim, the conduct, when 
constitutionally undertaken by peace officers to arrest a subject under these 
circumstances, does not rise to the level as to be intolerable in a civilized society. 
Nothing about Defendants' conduct could be considered extreme or outrageous in 
this context and, therefore, summary judgment on this claim is warranted in 
Defendants' favor. R. 775. 
For similar reasons identified above, the same converse logic applies. The district court 
dismissed this claim because it found, based on purportedly undisputed facts, that the officers' 
actions were objectively reasonable, consistent with policy, and not constitutionally infirm. 
However, if this Court were to find that the district court erred because there were questions of 
fact as to those very issues, summary judgment was not appropriate. 
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Moreover, the district court's recognition that a private citizen's decision to let loose a 
dog to violently bite a person could be sufficiently outrageous conduct to support this claim 
would similarly apply, if not more so, when it is a police officer who lets the canine loose to 
violently attack a person in an unconstitutional manner. 
4. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Plaintiff's Claim for Negligent 
Failure to Train, Supervise, and Control. 
Officer Bonas described a bark and hold policy as giving the dog the discretion to bark or 
bite depending on what the dog perceives. R. 499, 153. According to the expert witness retained 
by Defendants, Idaho patrol dog certification standards require, inter alia, that canines pass an 
apprehension phase. That includes a scenario where the dog pursues a fleeing decoy who t.1.en 
stops to surrender. The dog is trained to recall without contacting the decoy, or go into a guard 
and bark contact. The apprehension phase of training also includes a scenario where the dog 
pursues a fleeing decoy, and "[t]he dog must apprehend the decoy and remain in place until told 
to release by t.½.e handler." R. 150, 151. The combination of these two training scenarios 
illustrates that BPD trains its dogs to have the discretion stop and bark when a suspect 
surrenders, or bite when the suspect continues to flee; this is the basic tenet behind the "bark and 
hold" policy. 
However, Officer Bonas testified in deposition that "[w]e don't want our dogs making 
decisions on their own based on what the dog is perceiving. We want the decision to be made 
solely by the handlers." R. 499. He disagreed that the canine used here was trained in a bark and 
hold fashion which is also reflected by his statement that the dog was trained to bite the first 
person it came into contact wit.½. R. 511. 
67 
Ms. James submitted the expert opinion testimony of Mr. Montgomery which established 
that law enforcement industry standards which are framed by the United State Department of 
Justice and the International Association of Police Chiefs recommend a bark and hold policy for 
police departments that use canines to search for and apprehend suspects. The district 
completely rejected the opinions of Mr. Montgomery. 
However, it failed to account for the fact that the BPD states that its policy regarding 
canine use is handler controlled which includes the fact a canine can be directed to bark and hold 
rather than bite and hold. It also rejected Officer Bonas' testimony reflecting that police canines 
were used at the BPD in a manner different than as stated in the policy. R. 510, 511. 
Whether or not the dog was trained consistent with BPD stated policy and whether nor 
not BPD was negligent in failing to train, supervise or control the canine are questions of fact. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ms. James has established a factual record, supported by competent and admissible 
expert testimony, that the officers in this case did not act in an objectively reasonable fashion, 
that they failed to follow policy and procedure, and that they ordered a canine to search for and 
attack a person who was not an "immediate" threat and whom they should have knovvn was in 
the building rightfully. Her only crime was breaking a window so that she could gain access to a 
dental lab where she had been previously working but locked herself out. While Ms. James was 
significantly intoxicated, there is no evidence in this record to reflect that she was ever 
threatening or aggressive or, for that matter, cognizant that a swarm of police officers were 
outside the building. Whether intoxicated or not, that does not mean an otherwise law abiding 
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citizen should expect to be attacked by police dog at her place of work. Ms. James deserves her 
day in court and the opportunity to give a full presentation of the evidence where a jury can 
assess the facts and the credibility of all parties. This Court should reverse the grant of summary 
judgment and remand the for trial. 
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